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Abstract: Some of the causes of the ‘sexual revolution’ during the past few 
decades are widely known: The development of relatively safe and reliable 
contraceptives, especially the birth-control pill; the ‘morning after’ pill; 
antibiotics to relieve or cure sexually transmitted diseases such as gonorrhea, 
herpes, and syphilis; the increased social acceptance of pre-marital sex, 
homosexuality, and other behaviors that formerly were considered deviant; 
and the legalization of abortion as the ultimate ‘contraceptive’. But little 
attention has been paid to two rather cerebral factors relevant to these 
developments – namely, ethical theories, and theories of overpopulation. In 
this paper I will argue that these two less well-known and more subtle factors 
have been at least as powerful as the more obvious factors mentioned above, 
in bringing about sea-changes in sexual mores. More specifically, I will argue 
that some implicit approaches to ethical theory are more conducive than 
others to bringing about the present status quo in sexual mores, and that the 
widespread belief in world overpopulation has not only changed the moral 
climate regarding sexuality, but has helped to redefine what is moral and 
what is immoral.  
 
I. Prevailing Moral Theories  
It is a good question whether moral theories come before or 
after actual human behavior. Although college classes in ethical theory 
commonly feature analyses of Kant’s Categorical Imperative or Rawls’ 
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theory of justice, it is unlikely that those who have learnt these 
theories, when facing a moral decision, would sit down and try to 
determine whether their personal maxim can pass the 
‘universalization’ test, or abstract from all their advantages and 
interests and try to put themselves in a Rawlsian ‘original position’. 
Possibly a few extremely cerebral professional moral theorists might 
try to work out personal applications of their theories, when faced with 
a moral decision. But it is much more likely that, for professionals and 
‘everyman’, moral theories sum up the sorts of principles that people 
already habitually follow, in making choices concerning right and 
wrong.  
If we wished to categorize these principles under the rubric of 
prevailing moral theories, a likely candidate for the implicit ethical 
commitment of denizens of modern industrial societies would be 
utilitarianism. Of course, very few people, even professed utilitarians, 
will reach for pencil and paper, to calculate positive and negative 
Benthamite ‘units of happiness’; they will content themselves with 
‘ballpark’ calculations. But many, going beyond ego-centered 
questions of personal advantage, will engage in serious ‘considerations 
of utility’ concerning the effect of their actions on the happiness of 
others, and in their actions will try to avoid inflicting suffering on 
others. In this sense, a utilitarian approach does seem to be the 
‘method’ by which many people in cultures such as ours make their 
moral decisions – and it is a procedure that jibes very well with 
democracy and the ‘majority’ principle. Just as we expect democratic 
leaders to work for the greater satisfaction of their constituents, so 
also we tend to judge our own moral caliber, by examining the 
beneficial or deleterious effects our actions have on those about us. 
Thus, even though most people have never studied utilitarian theory, a 
minimal, common-denominator utilitarianism may be their ‘rule of 
thumb’, or main strategy, for moral decision-making.  
As applied to sexuality, a utilitarian approach may emphasize 
maximizing enjoyment for all parties while avoiding harm in sexual 
encounters. The logical conclusion for those who think in this utilitarian 
fashion, outside the parameters of traditional mores and religious 
prohibitions, is the approval of anything between ‘consenting adults’ – 
in other words, prohibition of rape, incest, pedophilia, and any kind of 
sexual congress involving force or lack of consciousness, but 
acceptance of anything else. Thus contraception, pre-marital 
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cohabitation, and gay marriage are widely considered morally 
acceptable from a utilitarian vantage point, as long as the resulting 
benefits seem to outweigh any negative consequences. For those who 
confine their purview of consequences to existing persons, abortion is 
also acceptable, if it is considered conducive to the mental or physical 
health, or psychological fulfillment, or social advancement, of the 
mother; as well as conducive to a decrease in crime, decrease in 
welfare entitlements, etc. At present, most utilitarians would want to 
avoid harm to children and adolescents through sexual relationships 
with adults, although some argue that consent is possible in such 
cases. But consensual sex is a ‘slippery slope’: the prohibition of 
pedophilia and ephebophilia is likely to be eventually relaxed, under 
the rubric of extending experiences of pleasure even to consenting 
children. This has already taken place in Holland, where twelve-year-
olds are considered capable of engaging in consensual sexual 
activities.  
Another leading contender among prevailing but implicit moral 
theories is the Golden Rule, ‘do unto others as you would have them 
do unto you’, or, expressed negatively, ‘do not do to others what you 
would not want them to do to you’. The positive version, attributed to 
Jesus (Matthew 7:12, Luke 6:31), not only has Biblical sanction, but is 
also akin to modern ‘universalization’ moral theories (e.g., ‘consider 
whether you would want your personal moral maxim to be a universal 
rule for everybody’), considered by proponents like Kant to be more 
sophisticated and philosophically sound than the traditional Christian 
formulation of the Golden Rule. But many ‘persons on the street’, 
unacquainted with ethical theories, operate according to the Golden 
Rule. Although they may not think about this as their principle for 
moral action, it is applied tactically in their decision-making, and 
transmitted by parents to their children in informal discussions of 
values.  
In sexuality, the Golden Rule emphasizes logical consistency in 
your actions, and in what you expect from others. Contraceptive acts 
might be considered to constitute an issue outside the parameters of 
the Golden Rule, since contraception is portrayed as a private matter, 
and is not, strictly speaking, ‘doing’ anything to anybody. The Golden 
Rule can lead many to the condemnation of abortion, if they consider 
the fetus a person, since most people could not consistently want to 
have been aborted, themselves. Homosexuality is an ambiguous area. 
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Homosexual activities may be considered consistent with the Golden 
Rule, insofar as the homosexual might claim that he or she is doing to 
another what they would want the other to do to them. On the other 
hand, it might be considered a pattern of life responsible for perverting 
the youth, undermining marriage, spreading disease, etc. – not the 
sort of ‘right’ that you would want to be given to yourself and also, 
consistently, to others. And if one defines sex in terms of the male-
female relationship, homo-sexuality would turn out to be a misnomer.  
Less ambiguous in regard to sexual matters, and also 
possessing Biblical credentials, is the concept of a natural law. St. Paul 
adumbrates this idea in Romans 2:14–15, where he discusses God’s 
judgment of the Gentiles, who were not subject to the Jewish law:  
 
When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature the 
things contained in the law, they, having not the law, are a law 
unto themselves. They show the work of the law written in their 
hearts, their conscience bearing witness, and their thoughts 
accusing or else excusing one another on the day when God 
judges what is hidden in men.  
 
Paul hailed from Tarsus, which was a hotbed of Stoic 
philosophy, a major ancient source of natural-law thinking. It is quite 
possible that Paul was familiar with the Stoic theories, although there 
is nothing but circumstantial evidence for such intellectual influence. 
The specific applications of the ‘law of nature’ that Paul cites in 
Romans 2:21–22 are primarily the mandates included in the 
Decalogue – against stealing, adultery, etc. Paul’s implication is that 
such laws, rooted in human nature, were indeed given more explicit 
expression in Moses’ time, but were by no means the exclusive 
heritage of the Jews.  
In philosophical circles, the idea of a natural law in morals was 
further developed by later Stoic philosophers, incorporated into Roman 
legal thinking by classical jurists such as Ulpian and Gaius, and 
subjected to further refinement by medieval scholastics, especially St. 
Thomas Aquinas, who fortified natural-law theory with Aristotelian 
metaphysics and psychology. In the late medieval era, Renaissance 
and Enlightenment, both Catholic and Protestant ethicists refined and 
perpetuated natural law theory, before it was overshadowed by 
utilitarianism, Kantian universalism, and other theories in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.1  
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But two twentieth-century developments have given an impetus 
to the revival of natural-law thinking: The first was the Nuremberg 
trials at the end of World War II, which raised the question: is there 
some superior law that can be used as the criterion justifying the 
court’s judgment of Nazi officers, who were arguably following valid 
laws of the land? The second development was Pope Paul VI’s 1968 
encyclical letter on birth control, Humanae vitae, which invoked 
natural law as well as religious incentives against the use of artificial 
contraceptive devices to avoid pregnancy. The Pope’s position was 
criticized by many ethicists and has been the catalyst for a crisis of 
authority in the Church. However, many natural-law theorists came to 
the defense of the Pope, and their writings have led to a further 
exploration both of the theoretical foundations of natural law, and of 
the applications which it may have in law and in morals.  
Opposition to natural-law theory in the twentieth century has 
been largely fueled by dogmatic adherence among analytic ethicists to 
David Hume’s famous interdiction about ‘deriving an ‘‘ought’’ from an 
‘‘is’’; other analytic commitments include a sacrosanct observance of 
the ‘fact-value’ distinction, and resolute avoidance of the ‘naturalistic 
fallacy’. Natural-law theory, since it purports to find certain ethical 
norms rooted in human nature itself, seems to break these established 
rules. I and other writers have argued that natural law, as traditionally 
understood, is not indeed guilty of an infraction of any of these 
metaethical rules.2 However, largely as a result of such criticisms, in 
the last few decades the natural-law tradition has split into two 
‘camps’ – the ‘new natural law’ theorists, which claim to support a 
version of natural law which obviates Humean objections, and the 
traditional natural-law theorists.3 These two camps are in 
disagreement about metaphysical or anthropological presuppositions 
(whether there can be a grounding in human nature itself for moral 
norms), but maintain a large bedrock of agreement on many practical 
issues. In sexuality, a pivotal principle concerns the necessary 
connection of sexuality with reproduction, and/or the avoidance of 
‘contra-life’ sexual practices. Contraception is opposed, as bringing 
about an absolute artificial separation of sexuality from the production 
of new life – a separation which can lead by a ‘slippery slope’ to the 
legitimation of ‘recreational sex’ of all types, including fornication and 
homosexual activities. Various types of Natural Family Planning (NFP) 
are, however, considered by most natural-law theorists to be morally 
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acceptable: e.g., the Billings Ovulation Method, the Sympto-Thermal 
Method, and the Standard Days Methods. With these methods, the 
knowledge of ovulation states can be used either to promote or to 
delay fertility, and does not necessarily involve any direct contra-life 
intention.  
Objections to the Pope’s invocation of natural law in Humanae 
vitae often cite the alleged unreasonableness of requiring that every 
single act of sexual intercourse be oriented toward reproduction. This 
interpretation is a mistake. Like many directives of natural law, the 
obligations with regard to sexual intercourse are not spelled out as 
multiple positive duties; only certain negative boundaries are pointed 
out. Some examples from other precepts of the natural law can help to 
clarify the importance of these ‘negatives’: For instance, the duty of 
telling the truth does not imply that we have to give everyone the 
positive information that they may request from us, but only that we 
do not tell them falsehoods; the duty of self-preservation does not 
entail that we must take all available vitamins, ‘work-out’ regularly, 
receive optional surgical procedures, etc., but only that we do nothing 
that would be seriously contrary to preserving oneself – suicide being 
the most extreme example; the duty of advancing in knowledge of 
God does not require us to engage in theological investigations, but 
only to avoid an ideological mind-set which shuts out any possibility of 
such knowledge; and the duty of advancing rational social structures 
does not mean we must perform this or that specific and highly 
esteemed action for community betterment, but only that we avoid 
anything that will contribute to serious social disintegration. Like the 
daimon of Socrates, which he describes in Plato’s Apology as 
counseling only what Socrates should not do, but not what he should 
do, natural-law directives, like the last seven commandments of the 
decalogue, focus on some ultimate ‘thou shalt nots’, setting certain 
parameters beyond which morality would ipso facto be abandoned. In 
the case of a natural-law approach to sexuality, the limiting 
parameters have to do with types of sexual intercourse intended to 
make reproduction impossible. In Natural Family Planning, merely 
refraining from intercourse during presumed fertile periods is not a 
transgression of those parameters. In using abortifacient 
contraceptives such as IUDs, Norplant and Depo-Provera, not only is 
the contra-life intention clear; but the two issues of abortion and 
contraception begin to converge – as also with the use of 
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contraceptive pills, which sometimes work after fertilization to prevent 
implantation of the fertilized egg. Even those who view contraception 
as morally permissible, but are opposed to abortion, sometimes have 
objections to the use aborifacient contraceptives.  
Some Christian ethicists make a sharp distinction between 
sexual intercourse as reproductive, and, on the other hand, as 
contributing to love and communion among spouses. They say that 
since these aims are equally important in marriage, a couple might 
cultivate just the latter aim, especially if the former aim is perceived 
as an obstacle to marital communion. But this is an artificial and stark 
separation of the aims of individuals from the aims of nature – like 
separating eating as enjoyment of the fruits of nature from its 
contribution to health – after the pattern of the ancient Roman 
vomitoria, which allowed participants in banquets to eat for hours and 
hours without stop, or (to cite a more contemporary phenomenon) the 
eating disorder, bulimia. (As in the examples cited above, the 
‘negatives’ are important here; no one is saying that every act of 
eating has to be positively directed towards conservation of health, but 
only that an act which clearly scorned the purpose of eating in the 
pursuit of pleasure is unnatural and immoral.) Everyone knows that 
love or affection are very often not connected with sexual intercourse, 
and in fact indifference or hate are often the unfortunate concomitants 
of the act; but for nature itself, even construed in the context of 
Darwinian ‘natural selection’, the ‘intent’ of reproduction is always a 
concomitant of the sex act. A natural-law approach leads us to join our 
purposes with the implied purposes of nature as far as possible.  
 
II. The Overpopulation Myth  
The widespread diffident attitude toward natural law (due in 
large part to a misunderstanding of the meaning of natural law) is not 
the only, or even the most important, catalyst for altering the moral 
landscape of sexuality. An even more serious challenge to traditional 
standards of sexual morality is the widespread belief, often a tenet of 
scientific ‘faith’, that the world is overpopulated, and that we must do 
everything possible, individually and socially, to curb the number of 
offspring. This belief is often described as ‘neo-Malthusianism’, 
referring to the now-discredited eighteenth-century theory propounded 
by Thomas Malthus. Malthus theorized that, while the world’s food-
supply increased in arithmetical proportion, the world’s population 
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increased in geometrical proportion. This exponential growth of 
population, according to Malthus, would inevitably bring about the 
depletion of the world’s resources and concomitant famine, disease, 
poverty, etc.  
Early in the twentieth century, eugenicists formed the first flank 
in the battle against overpopulation. Margaret Sanger, citing the 
inspiration of Malthus and John Stuart Mill,4 opted for the elimination 
of ‘defectives’ in world populations by the use of contraceptives, and 
supported the efforts of the ‘Malthusian League’ to incorporate 
population reduction into the agenda of the League of Nations.5 In 
recent decades, and in an even more hysterical fashion, the Neo-
Malthusian, Paul Ehrlich, has been warning about catastrophic results 
of overpopulation. Ehrlich in his best-selling book of the sixties, The 
Population Bomb,6 predicted that by the end of the twentieth century 
hundreds of millions would die of starvation, India would collapse, 
England would disappear, etc. Ehrlich’s message, like Malthus’ 
message, was that the world’s population is rapidly outstripping the 
food supply of the planet, as if the food supply were something 
progressing in regular arithmetical intervals. But in fact the world’s 
food supply has steadily increased in something like ‘geometrical’ 
proportion; and with the help of agricultural technology and human 
ingenuity, food supplies can continue to increase in tandem with 
population.7  
Nevertheless, motivated only by ideology, and in spite of the 
fact that many European countries have arrived at such low birth 
levels that their continued existence is threatened, activists for 
contraception and abortion still invoke a ‘population explosion’. And 
the perception that there is just too little space for the people of the 
world persists – in spite of the fact that for the present 6.2 billion 
people in the world, outside Antarctica, there is about 246,000 square 
feet per person, and in spite of the fact that if the population of the 
entire world were relocated just in Texas in the United States, each 
person would have approximately 1300 square feet per person! The 
‘space’ in such statistical projections would include, of course, 
mountains and deserts, but also oases and valleys and fertile plains; 
and ‘horizontal’ space can be supplemented with ‘vertical’ space – 
multi-storey buildings, etc.  
It is obvious that what is called the ‘overpopulation problem’ is 
not a space problem, but more precisely a problem of distribution of 
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wealth and resources – a political/social/ethical issue. Even if, through 
massive worldwide sex education, the distribution of condoms, 
sterilization, etc., the world’s population could be reduced by one-sixth 
to around five billion, there is no guarantee that the percentage (or 
even the numbers) of poor people would be reduced; the ratio of 
impoverished to the well-fed could even grow to greater heights. 
Worst-case scenarios may prevail. For example, even after such a 
hypothetical reduction in population, parents with fewer children may 
have less help in farming work, fewer contributors to the family 
finances, and less assistance from family members in their old age; 
employers, aware that families are smaller, may cut wages 
proportionally; government officials, administering a decreasing 
population, may curtail distribution of resources and/or raise taxes to 
increase revenues; and so forth. Simple formulas for reducing the 
number of children can have no predictable effect on such problems.  
The effect of neo-Malthusianism on Christian ethics is little 
noticed, but enormous. In spite of the failure of the predictions of 
overpopulation gurus to come true, many now consider the Biblical 
mandate, ‘increase and multiply’ (Genesis 1:28) to be outmoded – 
possibly significant for our distant ancestors, but no longer applicable 
even for those who adhere to Judaeo-Christian traditions. Put 
differently, the common modern wisdom maintains that we have 
fulfilled this command. The argument goes: God should certainly be 
satisfied with our numbers now; and – although God hasn’t revealed 
His will about this in any explicit way – presumably He wills us to 
follow what is generally held to be the ‘best’ science today. Needless to 
say, the moral fallout of the overpopulation myth has been 
considerable. By many committed to overpopulation dogma, it is now 
considered to be a virtue to do anything possible to avoid 
reproduction.  
The combination of the rejection of the natural law regarding 
contraception and a pseudo-scientific and quasi-religious commitment 
to reducing the world’s population, combined with the other cultural 
and technological developments mentioned at the outset of this paper, 
leads not illogically to wide-ranging changes in sexual morality. If 
contraception is legitimate for married couples, why not also for any 
‘consenting adults’ – granted that the latter are motivated by love as 
much as, or even more than, married couples? And why draw a line for 
‘consent’ at some artificial measure of ‘legal adulthood’, like eighteen 
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years of age? Likewise, homosexuality and masturbation, which by 
definition eschew reproduction, can easily be construed as advancing 
social objectives such as ‘zero population growth’. Even pornographers 
might consider themselves moral standard-bearers for promoting the 
pursuit of innocuous personal pleasure rather than selfish and 
inconsiderate family breeding. Abortion, for a liberal Christian, 
extremely distraught about uncontrollable population growth and 
dedicated to the affirmation of women’s rights, might be considered 
the ‘lesser of two evils’ – the ‘other evil’ being inconsiderate additions 
to the world’s population.  
The synergetic effect of the combination of the contraceptive 
mentality with overpopulation hysteria may be lessened if we begin to 
grapple with the real overpopulation issue – recognizing the realities 
underlying this issue, recognizing the injustices and inequities 
prevailing in domains such as politics, economics, and business. The 
fact that, for example, the United States, with 5% of the world’s 
population, is consuming 30% of the world’s resources, cannot be 
ignored. Our growing awareness of this imbalance should inspire both 
individual and communal efforts to right the wrongs, and reduce the 
gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’. But – ‘overpopulation’ 
being understood as the excessive numbers of impoverished people – 
simplistic solutions like global promotion of contraception and abortion 
will do nothing to alleviate global injustices; and married couples will 
do nothing to sustain the planet, and make no advances in personal or 
civic virtue, by intentionally avoiding offspring. 
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